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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 




Throughout the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century, France established itself as the 
cornerstone of technical development in the 
field of transportation. The innovations that 
have taken place through the creation of the 
TGV (Tres Grande Vitesse) high-speed rail sys-
tem and the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel have put France in the lead in trans-
portation development within the European 
Union. Through their development, France has 
started an effort to create a physically unified 
Europe. Therefore, as we move into the twen-
ty-first century, France is in a position to take 
the lead in the creation of an innovative and 
efficient transportation infrastructure con-
necting Europe. 
Since the inception of the European 
Union, all member nations have been forced to 
change their perspectives on infrastructure 
development. Previously, the main planning 
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had been done from a national standpoint. 
Nations planned with the aim of opening and 
connecting regions within a particular country. 
(Voight, p. 291) With the creation of the Union, 
national leaders are beginning to realize that 
an efficient and unified transportation infra-
structure joining nations must be in place for 
a unification to be successful. This effort will 
require a careful integration of each national 
blueprint into an ultimate transport network. 
To be successful, this integration needs to be 
strategic in its orientation and flexible in its 
implementation. (Button, p. 52) It is now up 
to France and its government to employ the 
existing technological foundation in France and 
take advantage of the central location of France 
within the European Union. 
In this essay, I will discuss the growth that 
is expected to occur in France and all of Europe 
and demonstrate the impact that a continuous 
European infrastructure would have on reduc-
ing congestion. I will also discuss the possible 
sources of funding for the infrastructure invest-
ments and demonstrate the social and eco-
nomic impacts that France's investment in the 
TGV system has had on the nation. Finally, I 
will argue that through international coopera-
tion now evident in Europe, the TGV system has 
the ability to become the main focus of a uni-
fied European transportation network. 
Existing Transport Infrastructure 
in France 
Since construction began in 1975, 
France's TGV system has established itself as 
the leader in high-speed rail transit in Europe. 
The TGV is an electric rail system owned and 
operated by the French national rail company, 
SNCF (Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer 
Franc;ais). The TGV currently operates on three 
branches centered in Paris: SudEst, Atlantique 
and Nord. The passenger cars are designed with 
comfort in mind so passengers do not feel like 
they are traveling at nearly 300 km/h. The TGV-
SudEst carries an average of 53,000 passengers 
daily, with a very profitable 30 percent rate of 
return. (Strohl, p. 83) Inaugurated in 1981, the 
SudEst travels from Paris to Valence in the 
southeast of France via St. Florentin and Lyon. 
This line yielded the SNCF a $382 million (FF 
2.0 billion, 1991 dollars) profit in 1991. ("TGV 
System Map") The TGV-Atlantique established 
the world's record for the fastest travel by a rail-
way train at 513.3 km/h. The Atlantique trav-
els west from Paris and reaches Le Mans, 
Courtalain and Tours. This line, which began 
service in 1989, yielded a $157 million (FF 816 
million, 1991 dollars) net profit in 1991. ("TGV 
System Map") The newest line, the TGV-Nord, 
began service in 1993 with service from Paris 
north to Lille (and into Brussels) and Calais 
(into the Channel Tunnel and England). 
As shown on the map, the current track 
system nearly traverses France north-south and 
east-west. The recent completion of the 
Channel Tunnel from England to France adds 
to the ability of the TGV system, and for the first 
time England is permanently linked to conti-
nental Europe. Soon it will be possible for a 
traveler to travel through England, France, Italy 
and Germany entirely by rail. 
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TGV System Map 
Approximate location of TGV system tracks. 
Source: "France - Map." Online. Available: 
http://www.lonelyplanet.com.au/dest!eur/ 
graphics/map-fra.htm. 
Although Germany possesses similar high-
speed rail technology, the French system is 
more developed. Plans now exist for the TGV 
system to be extended into Germany, Italy and 
Spain for the turn of the century. With the new 
international development, it is evident that 
Europe has accepted the TGV system as an 
important transport system needed to lead the 
European Union toward a unified state. With 
this goal in mind, the SNCF plans to put into 
operation 2,800 miles of new line in the next 20 
years. Each mile is estimated to cost $14.3 mil-
lion (FF 83 million, 1997 dollars) for construc-
tion and $13,700 (FF 80,000, 1997 dollars) in 
maintenance costs. (Schaer, p. 608) 
The first of the projects, currently under 
construction, is the TGV-Thalys line, an inte-
grated, international service which will serve 
Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and Cologne. The 
technical advances of the Thalys will allow 300 
km/h operation while running on the four dif-
ferent power sources used by France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Germany. The project is 
scheduled to be fully operational by 2003. ("TGV 
Thalys") It is estimated that each ten-car train 
set will cost $22.4 million (FF 130 million, 1997 
dollars). The ownership of the eighteen cars on 
the line will be divided between the national rail 
companies of the four nations. (Strohl, p. 96) 
This is the second step France has made in an 
effort to use its geographical location to devel-
op an integrated international transport system. 
Geography 
Geographically, France is positioned at the 
center of the European Union. France borders 
six member nations and has seaports on the 
Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and the 
English Channel. Spain is the only other nation 
with ports on both the Atlantic Ocean and 
Mediterranean Sea while two bordering coun-
tries, Luxembourg and Switzerland, have no 
coastline at all. As one moves into Central and 
Eastern Europe, there are several other nations 
which do not have the benefit of seaports to 
transport goods and people. Therefore, a high-
ly developed French rail system with the ability 
to transport goods and travelers throughout all 
of Europe would be beneficial to other nations. 
The development of an integrated and efficient 
high-speed rail line, which has the ability to haul 
heavy freight, would likewise be in the best 
interests of the European Union, not just 
France. Although still in the research stages, 
developments are being made in an effort to 
place high-speed freight cars in the French sys-
tem. The heavier load carried by freight trains 
relative to passenger trains requires special 
design considerations. With prime geographi-
cal location, the ability to transport goods and 
people through France into the rest of Europe 
will help further the development and expan-
sion of France and of the European Union. The 
ability to haul heavy freight would be the next 
step in the growth of the TGV system. 
The Continued Development 
of the TGV 
The first generation of TGV is in place on 
the SudEst line, having come into service in 
1981. In the years since, improvements in tech-
nology have increased the capacity, speed and 
comfort of the trains. The 1989 inauguration 
of the second generation, the TGV-Atlantique, 
allows speeds of 300 km/h due to improvements 
in engine design, braking and passenger com-
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fort. New auto-piloted motor technology has 
allowed the increase in speed on what is both a 
longer and heavier train car, providing a 30 per-
cent increase in capacity (485 seats versus 371). 
This gain has been accomplished by increasing 
engine revolutions per minute from 3,000 to 
4,000. (Walrave, 1986, p. 53) 
The SNCF, in conjunction with the railway 
brake industry, has also developed new disc 
brakes with power and energy well above their 
first generation TGV counterparts. The higher 
maximum speeds resulted in the need for this 
better braking performance. The removal of the 
brake shoes rubbing against the wheels has 
resulted in both a more efficient train and a qui-
eter ride. In addition to the lower noise level, 
travel on the TGV has become smoother with the 
introduction of a pneumatic suspension system. 
The first generation cars, however, did not need 
to be altered in their entirety. One of the more 
impressive features of the SudEst, the acousti-
cal innovations, remains in place in the newer 
cars. The placement of "bogies" (noise sources) 
remains between coach bodies and remote from 
passenger areas. (Walrave, 1986, p. 52) This 
reduces the noise levels in the cars from the fric-
tion of the wheels riding on the rails. 
The TGV-Atlantique technology has been 
applied to the cars on the TGV-Nord branch 
which opened in 1993. This is the branch con-
necting Paris and Brussels with a link to 
England through the Channel Tunnel. Each 
Eurostar train through the Channel Tunnel car-
ries 794 passengers at speeds of 130 km/h 
through the tunnel and 300 km/h on the con-
tinent. ("Channel Tunnel and Eurostar") The 
development of this line signified the first step 
in international cooperation in the development 
of rail transport. The effort and cooperation was 
unparalleled in European history, and the con-
struction of the Channel Tunnel stands as one 
of Europe's largest infrastructure projects ever. 
England is now linked to continental Europe 
through the $13 billion (FF 2.2 trillion, 1997 
dollars) joint venture. 
Growth of Traffic 
As Europe moves from a state of isola-
tionism to open borders, great strains will be 
placed on its infrastructure. The removal of 
border crossing checkpoints and free move-
ment from nation to nation have allowed trav-
elers to complete their journeys with ease never 
before seen in this region of the world. Due to 
the new freedom of movement in Europe, the 
most significant growth in passenger transport 
has come from cross-border traffic, which 
everywhere is growing more rapidly than 
domestic traffic. (Voight, p. 311) With contin-
ued continental integration, the growth in the 
transport sector is bound to continue on at least 
the same pace in the future. 
With a currently congested highway sys-
tem, the citizens of France will be forced to look 
towards alternate modes of transportation. Data 
compiled by the ECMT (European Conference 
of Ministers of Transport) showed that road traf-
fic increased by a factor of 2.2 between 1970 and 
1991 in Western Europe. Continued growth at 
this rate may lead to a substantial increase in 
the use of railways, specifically the TGV. As the 
rail system expands, more and more citizens 
will look towards the TGV system for its com-
fort and ease relative to automobile travel. This 
is a trend that was witnessed before and after 
the opening of the SudEst line in 1981. From 
1980 to 1985 there was a 75 percent total 
increase in the use of rail in France. Of this new 
traffic, 18 percent was diverted from road trav-
el and 33 percent from air travel. As a share of 
the rail-air market, rail transport increased from 
52 percent of the market to 83 percent over the 
same five year period. (Nash, p. 388) This can 
be attributed directly to the TGV because the 
development of the system was the only major 
change in the French transportation infra-
structure during this time. This shows how 
quickly the citizens of France adapted to the 
introduction of the TGV. 
As the comfort level in riding on the TGV 
rises, more and more people may even use it as 
their daily mode of transportation to and from 
work. The TGV allows a citizen to work in one 
region of France and live in an entirely differ-
ent region. In this respect, the TGV has a 
tremendous advantage over automobile travel. 
However, recently it has become unnecessary 
to travel at all in order to do business. 
I 
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Alternatives to Travel 
With the opening of European borders, 
long-distance travel can only be expected to 
increase over the first part of the next century. 
Historically, the growth in personal transport 
has been nearly perfectly proportional to the 
growth of communication. (Andersson, p. 7 4) 
However, the rapid and sustained growth of the 
telecommunications industry has created a new 
outlook on these projections. Technological 
advancements in telecommunications have, in 
some instances, made long-distance travel 
obsolete. With the ability to teleconference, it 
is no longer always necessary for one to travel 
for a meeting. The meeting can now take place 
over the phone lines. The growth in the 
telecommunication sector will act, in effect, to 
constrain some of the forecasted traffic growth. 
(Button, p. 45) 
Travel Projections 
The growth in traffic, particularly auto-
mobile traffic, within France during the last few 
decades has been astounding. Road traffic 
increased by 79 percent between 1970 and 1987, 
while goods moved by roads has risen by 93 per-
cent in France over the same period. (Button, 
p. 33) The growth in road traffic has lightened 
the load that the rail transport sector has had 
to carry. From 1970 to 1991, the rail sector of 
the total transport market fell from 30 percent 
to 17 percent. (Voight, p. 300) This trend must 
be reversed in order for France - and Europe 
- to avoid gridlock on the highways as pas-
senger transport in France continues to grow. 
Currently, the estimated cost of time lost due 
to traffic congestion ranges between 1.3 and 3.4 
percent of France 's GDP. (Claisse, p. 638) 
Between 1988 and 2010, France is expected to 
experience an annual growth rate of 3.3 percent 
in passenger transport. (Voight, p. 304) This 
means a further increase in economic losses to 
the French citizens unless the government of 
France changes its position on the development 
of transport networks. 
The underlying problem is that under cur-
rent policies the efficiency of the transport sys-
tem will inevitably deteriorate in Europe as con-
gestion develops. (Button, p. 34) Linked to this 
problem is the realization that there may be dif-
ficulties in terms of congestion of existing facili-
ties, and massive expansions in capacity are 
unlikely to be the answer. There is a need to 
develop entirely new transport networks within 
Europe. (Button, p. 34) The imminent conges-
tion on the highway system can be effectively off-
set by a highly developed high-speed rail network. 
The new era of European cooperation has 
led to an effort to develop a Western European 
high-speed rail network to be operational by 
2010. With the reduction in border checkpoints 
and in non-physical barriers, long-distance traf-
fic in Western Europe will increase by half from 
1988 to 2010, and cross-border traffic will 
increase by 90 percent. (Voight, p. 306) A prime 
example of cross-border traffic is the operation 
of the TGV-Nord. For this line, the SNCF pro-
jected 15 million passengers in its first year of 
operation and 31.5 million passengers by 1998. 
(Strohl, p. 97) A separate forecast from the 
OECD concluded that ground transport in 
France will increase by nearly 50 percent 
between 1988 and 2010. This means that the 
average French citizen will increase the distance 
traveled every day to and from work, social 
events, meetings, etc., from 32 km per day to 4 7 
km per day. This is a larger increase than that 
forecasted for the United States over the same 
period. (Andersson, p. 73) This leaves the gov-
ernment of France in a situation requiring it to 
expand the TGV system to avoid the congestion 
that comes along with national growth. 
Transport Solutions and the Need for 
a Centralized Plan 
The problem of successfully handling 
European economic growth has been addressed 
by the member states of the European Union. 
Their December 1994 meeting planned the 
launch of fourteen major transport projects. 
("Trans-European Networks") Of the fourteen 
projects, four are TGV high-speed rail lines with 
a European dimension. These are lines which 
would carry the TGV across the French borders 
and onto foreign soil, joining the Channel 
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Tunnel and the TGV-Nord project in an inter-
national capacity. The first of these projects has 
been the construction of the Thalys line con-
necting Paris, Brussels, Cologne and 
Amsterdam. Yet another connects Paris with 
Strasbourg on the France-Germany border, 
while a third includes a France-Spain high-
speed train. The fourth project is for a Lyons-
Turin high-speed line. ("Trans-European 
Networks") These projects signal the first step 
towards a European Transport Policy. 
France was quick to recognize the impor-
tance of a central, unified transport policy. 
Early in the development of the Union, France 
requested that the transport policy be written 
into the Treaty on the European Union, known 
as the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty states that 
transport networks should be developed to 
"promote the interconnection and interoper-
ability of national networks while taking 
account of the need to link island, landlocked 
and peripheral regions with the central regions 
of the Community." ("The Citizen's Network") 
This document made the development of a uni-
fied transport policy a European policy, and 
requires that all member nations plan transport 
networks that are efficient and cohesive with 
existing and planned networks of other nations. 
Once a national policy has been initiated, 
the problem then lies with the implementation 
of that policy. Since there does not exist a cen-
tral authority to control and direct projects 
within the Union, there is a great challenge in 
trying to obtain funding and coordinating the 
projects with member nations. A European-
wide authority responsible for the internation-
ally important infrastructure improvements 
would assist in coordinating investment pro-
grams and help ensure greater compatibility of 
technical standards. (Button, p. 49) Without 
coordination, the directives· set forth by the 
member states would never get off the ground. 
As Europe becomes more economically 
(and possibly politically) integrated, national 
transport policies will have to be subsumed into 
wider international policies. Whatever the ini-
tial intention, national ownership and operation 
of transport possess the inherent danger that 
national governments will attempt to manipu-
late the system to their own economic ends. 
This has been one of the traditional stumbling 
blocks in the creation of a European Union 
Common Transport Policy. (Button, p. 51) 
Sources of Funding 
After developing a transport policy, the 
need to fund transport projects has been the 
next hurdle in the effort to create an intercon-
nected and unified Union. The complications 
of bringing together fourteen separate coun-
tries and agreeing on a common objective and 
on a best way to achieve the objective have 
proven to be more difficult than previously sus-
pected. The problem stems from the strong 
heritage and isolation that these nations have 
felt for centuries. 
The members of the Union have been, up 
to this point, unable to view the problem from 
a continental perspective. As Rana Roy, chief 
economist of the European Centre for 
Infrastructure Studies, has stated: "The bene-
fits of the Trans-European Network projects are 
significantly greater for the Union as a whole 
than for its individual countries." (Bruce, p. 25) 
Even when the members can remove their tun-
nel vision, the questions of how to pay for the 
projects and who will supply the funding remain. 
Again, although fourteen transport proj-
ects have been envisioned by the Union, there 
exists a wide gap between what projects can be 
technically developed and what projects can be 
funded. As Sir Brian Unwin, President of the 
European Investment Bank, states, "There is a 
gap in many cases between a project being eco-
nomically and financially viable and unless you 
get a grant or equity to bridge that gap, then it 
cannot be done." (Bruce, p. 25) The effort to 
bridge the gap in France is coming from three 
directions: the European Union and its mem-
bers, the government of France and the SNCF, 
and the privatization of public resources. 
Funding from the European Union 
In order for the Union as a whole to agree 
to fund a transport project, the agreement of the 
member states on the worthiness of the project 
is required. A problem with this is that it is dif-
ficult for the representatives of England, for 
example, to see the benefits of a new project in 
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Italy. As a result, it has been very difficult for the 
member states to agree on the validity of many 
projects because it is difficult for them to place 
the good of the Union ahead of the good of their 
nation. The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development sees the improvement of the 
transport infrastructure as one of its main func-
tions. As a result, indications are that the bank 
is going to commit a substantial part of its own 
resources to this end. (Button, p. 50) 
Another possible source of funding is the 
European Investment Bank. The EIB will pro-
vide long-term loans to complement direct sub-
sidies to bring the less developed regions of 
Europe up to the standards of the Union. 
Between 1995 and 2000, European funding will 
come from "structural funds" for regions whose 
devel<_:>pment is lagging behind, and from a spe-
cial budget heading for the other regions. 
("Trans-European Networks") With loans from 
such institutions as the EIB, certain invest-
ments have become possible. Other invest-
ments, however, will have to be funded directly 
from the nation in which the project is planned. 
Funding from France 
For those TGV projects which do not 
receive funding from the Union, it will be up to 
France to supply the necessary resources to 
bring them to fruition. The TGV was developed 
through support from France. Nearly all of the 
funding for the TGV came from the SNCF, with 
the difference being subsidized by the French 
government. The TGV-SudEst was financed by 
the SNCF through borrowing on the domestic 
and international markets. (Rid! Network ... , 
p. 75) Approximately ten years after full com-
missioning, the full cost of the new line, $3 bil-
lion (FF 17.1 billion, 1981 dollars), will have 
been paid back. (Mathieu, p. 689) The TGV-
Atlantique, which cost $1.2 billion in 1986 (FF 
7.75 billion, 1986 dollars), received financing 
from the French government for 30 percent of 
the infrastructure costs. The SNCF borrowed 
the remaining 70 percent from the money mar-
ket. (Rail Network ... , p. 78) While it seems 
unlikely that nations will be quick to invest in 
the TGV, it is reasonable to see the attractive-
ness of the TGV to private investors. 
Privatization 
The movement toward privatization of 
transport is being led by the Union itself. 
Recent European Union directives have adopt-
ed an objective that national railway compa-
nies be "unbundled," meaning that the tracks 
and trains should be under separate owner-
ship. (Bruce, p. 25) This coincides with a gen-
eral European trend towards greater involve-
ment by the private sector in the supply of 
goods and services. (Button, p. 50) Recently 
this trend has moved into the transport sec-
tor in the European Union. 
Great Britain is leading the way in the 
effort to privatize the transport sector. British 
Rail is no longer under government control, 
and the United Kingdom is well on a course 
to privatize twelve percent of its highway net-
work. ("Consortium ... ," p. 26) The decen-
tralization of transport policy decision mak-
ing in many European countries has begun to 
take place over the past decade. (Button, p. 
50) Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands have all made efforts to privatize 
their railways. The trend in these countries 
has been to separate infrastructure from oper-
ations. (Privatisation. .. , p. 153) The emer-
gence of the private sector as a source of fund-
ing has led the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to antici-
pate that a considerable part of its transport 
investment funds will be drawn from the pri-
vate sector. (Button, p. 50) It seems inevitable 
that private sector involvement in both the 
provision of transport infrastructure and in 
transport operations will increase into the 
next century. (Button, p. 50) 
The growth in private sector influence is 
expected despite the financial drawbacks of 
the construction of rail systems. Obtaining 
resources from the private sector is a chal-
lenge because initial construction costs are 
high. In addition, the attraction for the pri-
vate investor is limited from the outset due to 
the long loan repayment periods required. 
(DeWaele, p. 12) Without a guaranteed level 
of profitability, private investors will not be 
attracted. (Walrave, 1993, p. 127) As I have 
demonstrated previously, the TGV has shown 
to be profitable in the past. With a seeming-
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ly guaranteed profitability, its attractiveness 
to future private investment seems assured. 
Influence of the TGV on the French 
Economy 
The development of the TGV and the com-
pletion of the Channel Tunnel have allowed the 
economy of France to grow and its citizens to 
be more productive. The TGV allows citizens 
to live in one region of France while working 
in another region, thereby reducing the num-
ber of cars on the roads. The reduction in traf-
fic congestion created by the use of the railway 
system has resulted in savings estimated to be 
two percent of France's GDP. These savings are 
four times the amount spent on public passen-
ger transport across the whole European Union. 
("The Citizen's Network") The development of 
the TGV has changed the face of the transport 
economy of France and reduced the use of less 
energy efficient modes of transport. 
Impacts on Air and Auto Transport 
The TGV has played a role in the reduction 
of automobile and air traffic along competitive 
routes. For example, on the main tollway in the 
south, which is in direct competition with the 
TGV-SudEst, traffic abruptly stopped growing 
in 1982, the first full year of operation of the 
SudEst. This phenomenon was not experienced 
on the tollways in the north and west, tollways 
not in direct competition with the SudEst line, 
during the first year of TGV service. (Mathieu, 
p. 1846) The shift in traffic towards the TGV 
has enabled the SudEst route to show an inter-
nal rate of return for the SNCF in excess of 15 
percent and a socio-economic rate of return of 
30 percent. (Mathieu, p. 1846) 
The TGV-Atlantique has had a similar 
impact. Since the line came into service, traffic 
growth on the Paris-Bordeaux and Paris-Le Mans 
tollways, which are in competition with the 
Atlantique, started to taper off immediately. 
(Mathieu, p. 1846) Again, this trend was not mir-
rored by the north and east tollways where traf-
fic volume ~ontinued to grow. (Mathieu, p. 1846) 
Air traffic along these routes has experi-
enced similar declines. A sharp drop in Paris-
Lyon air traffic has been noted. (Mathieu, p. 1845) 
Air services in competition with the TGV-
Atlantique have almost without exception expe-
rienced a substantial drop in traffic. (Mathieu, p. 
1845) Because the inauguration of the TGV-Nord 
line was so recent, no statistical trends can be 
discerned here. 
The shift to the TGV has also had a posi-
tive effect on the consumption of energy in 
France, which is a limited commodity. In 
France, highways and airplanes account for half 
of all oil consumption. Per passenger carried, 
the TGV consumes half the energy of an auto-
mobile and two-and-a-half to three-and-a-half 
times less energy than a plane. In addition, the 
TGV operates on "clean" energy, electricity. 
(Taille, p. 136) Another external benefit of the 
TGV system is its safety. The French argue that 
the installation of a TGV line in an area will 
bring about an annual reduction of 23 percent 
in the costs to the general public from auto-
mobile accidents. (Strohl, p. 107) Given the 
fact that railways are also three times more eco-
nomical in terms of land use than motorways, 
there should be no hesitation about the devel-
opment of new rail lines to connect regions of 
France and Europe. (Nilsson, p. 68) 
Regional Development 
France, as a nation, is composed of 22 
regions, each with its own mini-economy and 
regional industry. Throughout history, the 
growth and development of Paris has dwarfed 
the rest of the country. In 1950, the greater met-
ropolitan area of Paris, which covers only 2.2 
percent of the national territory, contained 18.6 
percent of the population, 33 percent of all new 
companies and nearly 25 percent of the nation-
al wealth. In an effort to offset the regional dis-
parities, in the 1960s France began to imple-
ment development policies aimed at achieving 
a more even distribution of economic activity 
and population. ("Regional Development") The 
shift in activity away from Paris resulted in an 
increase in competition among regions. Regions 
of France began to compete with each other in 
an effort to acquire business and development. 
All that changed, however, with the opening of 
European borders in the 1990s. 
With free movement within all of Europe, 
France has begun to plan in a European frame-
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work rather than with just a domestic mental-
ity. As a result, French regions are now far less 
likely to be competing among themselves than 
with their European counterparts. In this 
European perspective, plans are underway to 
stimulate development around a dozen or so 
regional cities which have been identified as 
having the potential to become "European" 
cities. ("Regional Development") One common 
denominator that many of these cities have is 
service by the TGV. As part of France's drive to 
introduce business and investments to the 
outer segments of France, the TGV will serve 
as a vital resource. This is especially the case 
in regions not serviced by large airports. The 
impacts the TGV has had on regional develop-
ment can be seen by looking at the original 
line, the SudEst. 
Studies of the SudEst (Paris-Lyon) line 
have suggested some benefits and disadvan-
tages of the SudEst line for Lyon resulting from 
the TGV's construction. For instance, while 
there is no observable effect on industry, some 
service sector firms based in Lyon entered the 
Paris market; on the other hand, the ability to 
complete trips in a day reduced hotel business 
in Lyon. (Nash, p. 380) This means that few 
industries from Paris found themselves com-
peting more heavily with industries from Lyon. 
In fact, some firms based in Lyon were able to 
expand their base into the Paris market. The 
mobility that the TGV brings to the citizens of 
France can only aid in the strengthening of the 
regions surrounding Paris. 
Conclusion 
From a national perspective, it is clear 
that the continued development of the TGV sys-
tem is vital to the sustained growth of France. 
The TGV has proven itself as a reliable and safe 
mode of transport. Both the SudEst and 
Atlantique lines have been profitable for the 
SNCF, and a benefit to the French society as 
well. The electric TGV operates much more 
cleanly than auto or air transport and offers the 
speed and comfort of flying at a cost closer to 
that of road transport. This is what has made 
the TGV so attractive and will continue to do 
so in the future as the reliance on high-speed 
transport increases. Future development of the 
TGV should therefore focus on bringing about 
development and growth to various regions and 
spreading economic activity across the nation. 
In so doing, regional cities will have the ability 
to develop into cities of European importance 
on the level of London, Berlin and Brussels, 
among others. 
From a European standpoint, the further 
development of an integrated Trans-European 
high-speed rail network will be the foundation 
of continued prosperity in all of Europe. 
Without further international development of 
the TGV, traffic will continue to worsen on the 
already congested road systems. By extending 
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TGV technology throughout Europe, an effi-
cient network can be developed which will serve 
to link the economic centers of Europe. This 
has already begun with the connection of Paris, 
London, and Brussels with the recently com-
pleted TGV-Nord. In order to further this inter-
national integration the members of the 
European Union will need to develop policies 
from a continental perspective rather than from 
the traditional national perspective. The devel-
opment of a continuous high-speed rail net-
work through Europe will serve as an econom-
ic boost to the interested parties and the Union 
as a whole. 
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